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ABSTRACT: The failure of foreign aid to promote growth in the developing world has
received signiﬁcant attention as evidence suggests that foreign aid does not translate into in-
vestment. This research has demonstrated that poor institutions in these developing economies
(particularly with respect to property rights) results in an inability to fully appropriate the re-
turn to one’s investment, thereby serving as a prominent disincentive to investment. This paper
presents an experimental test of a a 2-player, one-shot game of conﬂict in which we vary the
strength of property rights. Our results suggest that stronger property rights reduce conﬂict and
increase investment. In addition, we test the conventional wisdom that technological progress
can increase the effectiveness of aid in stimulating investment. Contrary to intuition, we ﬁnd
technological progress has practically no effect on investment and that this failure to stimulate
investment is largely due to deﬁciencies in property right institutions.
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1 Introduction
Can foreign aid buy growth? This question was posed by Easterly (2003) in response to the ev-
idence presented by Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggesting that foreign aid promotes growth in
the presence of good institutions. The result is intuitively appealing: Good institutions create a
healthy environment for investment and investment translates into growth. However, empirical
investigations into the relationship between aid, institutions and growth have generated mixed
results (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Guillamont and Chauvet, 2001;
Lensink and White, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Easterly et al., 2004; Collier and Hoefﬂer,
2004). Indeed, it is not clear that aid translates into investment or investment translates into
growth (Easterly, 1999). Understanding the relationship between resource allocation (e.g., for-
eign aid) and investment in the face of imperfect institutions is therefore the logical starting
point to answering the question posed by Easterly (2003). That is, in order to determine if
foreign aid can buy growth, it must ﬁrst be established under what circumstances can foreign
aid yield investment.
In principal, there are two reasons why foreign aid will not be invested: either the marginal
cost of consumption is greater than the rate of return on investment or there is a problem with
appropriation. The problem of appropriation is one of the most prominent disincentives to in-
vestment in the literature (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; North, 1987; Murphy
et al., 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly, 2001;
Alesina and Weder, 2002; Gradstein, 2004; Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez and Neary, 2008; Grad-
stein, 2007). One manner in which the appropriation problem can manifest itself is in the form
of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Easterly, 2001; Alesina and Weder,
2002). Corruption acts as a tax on investment, and, like a tax, reduces the incentive to invest
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).1 Alternately, appropriation may be manifest through imperfect
institutions, particularly those involving property rights. Recent growth models have formal-
ized this problem, demonstrating how imperfect property rights result in the appropriation of
1Unlike tax revenues, it is unlikely that bribes are used for public good provision.
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investment returns occurs through costly conﬂict (Gradstein, 2004; Gonzalez, 2007; Gradstein,
2007; Gonzalez and Neary, 2008).2 This in turn reduces the incentives to invest, suggesting that
secure property rights are a necessary condition for aid to translate into increased invesmtent.
Whether its called corruption, conﬂict, or rent-seeking (Tullock, 1980), a lack of well-
deﬁned property rights results in resources being diverted from investment into appropriation
activities (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). This problem represents a variation
on the classic prisoner’s dilemma: A deﬁciency of property rights simultaneously creates an
incentive to protect one’s own investment and to steal someone else’s. Unlike the prisoner’s
dilemma, the conﬂict game promises hope; as property rights are increased, the return from
appropriative activities and the need to defend one’s invesmtents necessarily fall. This inturn
increases the resources and incentives to invesmtment.
Beyond the effect of property rights, Easterly (2001) and others have argued that the rate
of return on investment may be too low to induce investment suggesting that aid should be
accompanied with subsidized technological progress. On one hand, conventional wisdom sug-
gests increasing the overall productivity of the economy raises the return to investment, and
thus the opportunity cost of conﬂict. In this case, technological progress compliments the ef-
fect of property rights, raising the effectiveness of foreign aid.3 On the other hand, increasing
the return on investment also raises the return to conﬂict by increasing the return to investment
and thus the soils of appropriating another’s invesmtent. In this case, an increase in produc-
tivity offsets the effect of property rights, lowering the effectiveness of foreign aid. As such,
“an increase in overall economic productivity leaves the proportionate allocation of resources
between producing and ﬁghting unchanged” (Hirshleifer, 1991, p. 184). That is, the increased
incentive to invest and the increased incentive to engage in expropriation are completely offset.
Hence, raising the rate of return on investment, contrary to intuition, may have no effect on the
equilibrium level of investment.
2These papers are part of a larger literature on conﬂict (Haavelmo, 1954; Garﬁnkel, 1990; Grossman, 1991,
1994; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992, 1996; Gradstein, 2004; Gonza-
lez, 2007; Gradstein, 2007; Gonzalez and Neary, 2008; Schudel, 2008).
3We use effectiveness here to mean the fraction of aid that is invested.
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In this paper, we present the results of an experimental test of behavior in a 2-player, one-
shot game of conﬂict.4 Speciﬁcally, we explore how allocation decisions vary in response to
exogenous variations in property rights and the productivity of investment (e.g., the level of
technology). Our experiment explores the effects of two levels of property rights and two lev-
els of technology, resulting in a 2 x 2 design which we implement in a within-subjects design
wherein all subjects are exposed to all combinations of treatment parameter. The strength of
such a design is its ability to eliminate confounding subject-speciﬁc effects, since these are
constant across treatments. Furthermore, our design allows for the identiﬁcation of causal ef-
fects of property rights and technological progress on conﬂict and investment, since we observe
responses to exogenous changes in treatment parameters. These beneﬁts permit us to gain in-
sightsthatarelessreadilygainedthroughdirectempiricalresearch. Forexample, Besley(1995)
stresses the problem of endogeneity of property rights in traditional empirical investigations.
In the laboratory we present a controlled setting in which we study the mechanics of conﬂict in
hope of shedding light on the failure of aid to translate into investment (Easterly, 2001).
Following Grossman and Kim (1995) and Gonzalez (2007) we assume individuals allocate
resources (e.g., foreign aid) among (i) a productive investment generating consumable goods,
(ii) defensive appropriation which appropriates one’s own return on investment, (iii) offensive
expropriation which expropriates another individual’s return on investment, and (iv) direct (i.e.,
safe) consumption. The model distinguishes between offensive expropriation and defensive
appropriation in order to incorporate property rights into the conﬂict technology. The conﬂict
technology, or “contest success function” (Hirshleifer, 1989; Skaperdas, 1996), plays an inte-
gral role as it translates allocations into relative appropriations. Property rights determine the
effectiveness of allocations to defensive appropriation relative to offensive expropriation. Thus,
property rights strengthen ones claim to ownership and reduce incentives to divert resources to
offensive and defensive appropriation activities.
4This paper extends the experimental literature (Carter and Anderton, 2001; Duffy and Kim, 2005; Durham
et al., 1998) of conﬂict games being the ﬁrst to explicitly test the ability of property rights to reduce conﬂict and
increase investment.
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In general, we ﬁnd support for the predictions regarding property rights and technology. In
our experiment subjects reduce allocations to conﬂict in response to stronger property rights.
However, this effect is not symmetric. While offensive allocations decrease in response to
stronger property rights, the resources allocated to defensive activities remains unchanged. The
reduction in offensive appropriation however translates almost entirely into increased invest-
ment. Perhaps more importantly, we ﬁnd no reduction in appropriative activities in response to
improvements in productivity. This demonstrates the importance of property rights in creating
an environment in which aid can yield investment (and in turn growth). Without improvements
in property rights, improvements in technology fail to yield increased investment. Thus our
results highlight the importance of addressing institutional issues (e.g., property right regimes)
when considering the effects of allocating aid.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of conﬂict based on that of
Gonzalez (2007) from which we motivate our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and formal hypotheses. In section 4 we present the results from our analysis of subject
choices. Finally, we summarize and discuss the results in section 5.
2 A Game of Conﬂict
Following the models developed by Grossman and Kim (1995), Gonzalez (2007), and
Gonzalez and Neary (2008), we examine the optimal allocation of foreign aid under imperfect
property rights. We assume agents are endowed with aid and must choose how to allocate
these resources among competing economic activities. Speciﬁcally, we assume that aid can be
allocated to investment in productive activities that produce consumable goods, appropriation
of this investment, expropriation of someone else’s investment, or the aid can be exchanged
for an equivalent amount of consumable goods. As such, we ﬁrst derive the symmetric Nash
equilibrium allocations to consumption, investment, defensive appropriation and offensive ex-
propriation. We then examine the comparative statics of the model to derive predictions of
5Appropriation Through Conﬂict Bruner and Oxoby
the response of Nash equilibrium allocations to exogenous changes in property rights and pro-
ductivity. As in the cited literature, property rights are modeled as determining the relative
strength of defensive appropriation relative to offensive expropriation and productivity is sim-
ply the rate of return on investment. In what follows, we will demonstrate that increasing the
overall productivity of the economy initially increases investment through reductions in con-
sumption, however, beyond a point, it has no effect. By contrast, strengthening of property
rights is predicted to converge Nash equilibrium allocations towards Pareto optimality.
For simplicity, consider a game between two agents, i and j. Each agent is assumed to have
an equal endowment of resources (e.g., equal shares of foreign aid) E. Agents can allocate
their aid to an investment, ki, with an exogenous rate of return A. However, the return on
the investment Aki is not secure since property rights are not well-deﬁned. Resources may be
allocated to defensive appropriation xi in order to secure the return on the investment. Likewise,
aid may also be allocated to offensive expropriation zi to steal the other agents’ investment
returns. Finally, agent’s may choose not to allocate aid at all; they may consume it, ci. Thus,
each agent faces the following budget constraint:
Ei = ci+ki+xi+zi. (1)
The role of property rights is to determine the effectiveness of defensive appropriation
relative to offensive expropriation; property rights strengthen an agent’s claim to ownership.
We denote by pi the fraction of agent i’s return which she appropriates. We denote by qi the
fraction of agent j’s return which is appropriated by agent i (i.e., the amount expropriated by















6Appropriation Through Conﬂict Bruner and Oxoby
where m is the “decisiveness factor” (Hirshleifer, 1995) and π captures the strength of prop-
erty rights.5 This characterization of property rights captures the notion that property rights
strengthen ones claim of ownership, but the claim still has to be made. Since property rights
are imperfect (π < ∞), conﬂict arises as agents struggle to appropriate the return on their in-
vestment while expropriate that of others.6 Thus, agent i does not receive his entire return if
zj >0. However, stronger property rights increases the fraction of his return agent i receives for
a particular allocation (i.e.
∂pi
∂π > 0). Likewise, stronger property rights decreases the fraction
of j’s return i receives for a particular allocation (i.e.
∂qi
∂π < 0).
Each agent i seeks to maximize the sum of their consumption and appropriated returns:
max
xi,zi,ki,ci
Ui = ci+ piAki+qiAkj, (4)
subject to equation (1). Substituting equations (1), (2), and (3) into equation (4), the objective


























Equation (6) indicates that for interior solutions in xi and zi, a sufﬁciently large rate of return
on investment A and property rights π optimal consumption is a corner solution. That is, the





i = 0.7 In contrast, under sufﬁciently weak property rights and low rates of return on
5The decisiveness factor, m, is set equal to 1 for the purpose of the experiment. Durham et al. (1998) conduct an
experiment with exogenous variation in m to test whether ﬁghting intensiﬁes with higher levels of the decisiveness
factor. Their results suggest conﬂict intensiﬁes with the decisiveness factor.
6It is assumed that pi = 1 if xi = zj = 0 and qi = 1 whenever xj = 0 and zi > 0.
7The experiment is parameterized such that this condition is satisﬁed in the symmetric equilibrium.
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investment, optimal consumption is again a corner solution: agents should consume their entire
endowment c∗
i = E.

















(πxi+zj)2 = 0. (7)

















(πxj+zi)2 = 0. (8)
The term −Api in equations (7) and (8) represents the marginal opportunity cost of appro-
priative activities, the forgone marginal appropriated return on investment. The second terms
represent the marginal beneﬁt of increased appropriation. Thus, agents tradeoff higher returns
for more appropriation. Furthermore, since the marginal costs of the two appropriative activ-
ities are the same, in equilibrium the agents will equate the marginal beneﬁts of appropriative
activities. Equations (7) and (8) combined implicitly deﬁne the optimal level of investment
k∗
i = ki(π) = Ei−x∗
i −z∗
i . By imposing symmetry, we can explicitly deﬁne the optimal levels




















We now turn our attention to the effect of exogenous changes in the rate of return on in-
vestment and on the strength of property rights. Both the optimal level of defensive activity, x∗
i ,
and offensive activity, z∗









This is due to the assumption of a common production technology. In the symmetric Nash
equilibrium agents equate the marginal beneﬁts of offensive and defensive activities. Since the
agents’ investments earn equivalent rates of return, changing the rate of return will not effect
the equilibrium allocations. Thus, in contrast to conventional wisdom, increasing the rate of


























(π +3)2 < 0 (16)
Thus, only increasing property rights is predicted to increases the resources allocated to invest-
8In an alternate model in which investment or consumption were not corner solutions, this would not be the
case when π = ∞.















(π +3)2E > 0 (17)
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In this section we present our experimental design and motivate our hypotheses based on
the model above. The experiment implements all the elements of the theory to investigate
the effects of technological progress and property rights on investment and conﬂict. In each
decision period subjects are randomly paired with another subject (the other person) in the
session.9 Every subject was given an endowment of $10 lab to allocate among an investment,
appropriation of his investment (defensive spending), expropriation of the investment of the
other person (offensive spending), or direct consumption. The amount a subject allocates to the
investment is increased by a multiplier (rate of return on investment). The amount a subject
allocates to defensive spending increases the fraction of his own investment he retains provided
the other person allocates something to offensive spending.10 The amount a subject allocates to
offensive spending increases the fraction of the other person’s investment that he appropriates
for herself. These shares were based on the characterizations in equations (2) and (3) with
m = 1. Any endowment that is not allocated the subject retains and is added to his earnings for
the period (i.e. representing her direct consumption).
We implement a 2 x 2 within-subjects design, varying the return on investment (i.e. A in
the model, the investment multiplier) and property rights (i.e. π in the model, the effectiveness
of defensive spending relative to offensive spending). The investment multiplier was either 3
or 5 and and defensive spending is either 2 or 4 times as productive as offensive spending.11
This results in 4 treatments as summarized in Table 1 along with the symmetric Nash equilib-
9Italics are used throughout this section to indicate the exact terminology used in the experiment. Randomized
pairing is intended to minimize reciprocity. Durham et al. (1998) investigate the effect of ﬁxed pairs relative to
random pairs and ﬁnd the random pairs induces less cooperative behavior.
10If the other person does not allocate anything to offensive spending than the subject always receives his entire
investment, regardless of the amount allocated to defensive spending.
11Thus, defensive spending is always more effective than offensive spending.
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rium predicted values for investment, defense, and offense as a percentage of the endowment.
Subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment in each decision period.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Treatment Predicted (%) Predicted (%) Predicted (%) Predicted (%)
{A,π} Investment Conﬂict Defense Offense
T1 = {3,2} 60 40 20 20
T2 = {5,2} 60 40 20 20
T3 = {3,4} 70 30 15 15
T4 = {5,4} 70 30 15 15
Based on the model in section 2, we present the following hypotheses. Our ﬁrst hypotheses
concern the effect of property rights on conﬂict and investment, where conﬂict is deﬁned to
be the sum of the allocations to defense and offense spending. Let conﬂict and investment be
deﬁned, respectively, as
Conflict = βAπDAπ +βtRt+βPPi+εijt, (18)
and
Investment = βAπDAπ +βtRt+βPPi+εijt. (19)
where Dij is a vector of treatment dummy variables where A denotes the rate of return on
investment and π denotes the level of property rights, Rt is a vector of round ﬁxed-effects, Pi
is a vector of player ﬁxed-effects, and ε1
ijt is the unobserved error.12 According to equations
(15) and (16), appropriation and expropriation are decreasing in the level of property rights.
Therefore, we should observe a decrease in conﬂict from T1 to T3 and from T2 to T4.
Hypothesis 1 β3,2 > β3,4 and β5,2 > β5,4 : An increase in property rights should result in a
decrease in conﬂict, ceteris paribus.
According to equation (17), investment is increasing in property rights. Therefore, we should
observe an increase in investment from T1 to T3 and from T2 to T4.
12One of the strengths of a within-subjects design is that the player ﬁxed-effects should be uncorrelated with
the treatments, allowing for a cleaner test of treatment effects.
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Hypothesis 2 β3,2 < β3,4 and β5,2 < β5,4 : An increase in property rights should result in an
increase in investment, ceteris paribus.
The next two hypotheses concern the rate of return on investment on conﬂict and investment.
According to equations (12) and (13), appropriation and expropriation are unaffected by the
rate of return on investment. Therefore, we should observe an no difference in conﬂict between
T1 and T2 nor from T3 to T4.
Hypothesis 3 β3,2 = β5,2 and β3,4 = β5,4 : An increase in the rate of return on investment
should result in no change in conﬂict.
According to equations 14, investment is unaffected by the rate of return. Therefore, we should
observe an no difference in investment between T1 and T2 but we should observe an increase
in investment from T3 to T4.
Hypothesis 4 β3,2 = β5,2 and β3,4 = β5,4 : An increase in the rate of return on investment
should result in no change in investment.
The experimental sessions consisted of 5 practice periods (for no money) and 20 decision
periods. Prior to making any decisions, subjects were presented with instructions on the com-
puter screen which they proceed through as the moderator read aloud. Screen images are avail-
able upon request from the authors. Additionally, subjects were given aids intended to decrease
the cognitive burden of the decision (Smith and Walker, 1993). Subjects were provided with
two sets of tables on a sheet of paper which they retained throughout the experiment. The ﬁrst
tables gave the fraction of a subject’s investment they appropriated based on their allocation to
defensive spending and the other person’s allocation to offensive spending. The second tables
gave the fraction of the other person’s investment they expropriated based on their allocation to
offensive spending and the other person’s allocation to defensive spending. The decision screen
required subjects to enter not only their allocation but also their conjecture of the other person’s
allocation (see Figure 1). Based on their entries, the subject was shown both her own and the
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Figure 1: Decision Screen
other person’s hypothetical earnings for the period. This served as a proﬁt calculator for par-
ticipants in which the subject could enter as many allocation and conjecture combinations as
desired, selecting one of these combinations to be implemented as their decision in the round.
Subjects had ninety seconds to make the allocation decision.13
Upon completion of the decision task subjects were shown a summary screen showing
their earnings for the period and information from all periods. In order to maintain the static,
single period nature of the theory, 1 period is randomly selected for payment at the end of
the experiment. After the last period was completed a screen revealed the selected period to
the subjects in a session. After viewing this screen, subjects were asked a series of debrieﬁng
13If a subject failed to choose an allocation after ninety seconds, they retained their endowment (i.e. they
consumed their entire endowment).
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questions and paid for their participation in private.
The experiment was conducted in the University of Calgary Behavioral and Experimen-
tal Economics Laboratory (CBEEL) with subjects recruited via the lab’s Online Recruitment
System for Experimental Economics (Greiner, 2004). The experiment is programmed and con-
ducted with the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Experimental sessions last approximately
90 minutes and average earnings were $17 including a $5 show-up fee.
4 Analysis of Results

















































Low (2) High (4)
Level of Property Rights
Low Return (3) High Return (5)
Figure 2: Mean Conﬂict per Treatment
We begin the analysis of our results by examining the effects of the treatment variables
on observed levels of conﬂict. Recall, conﬂict is deﬁned to be the sum of the allocations made
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Table 2: Mean Conﬂict per Treatment as a Percentage of Endowment
Property Rights
Return on Investment Low (π = 2) High (π = 4) Test Statistic
Low (A = 3) 0.489 0.413 z = 4.961
(0.194) (0.168) Prob > z = 0.000
High (A = 5) 0.485 0.381 z = 7.557
(0.182) (0.159) Prob > z = 0.000
Test Statistic z = 0.404 z = 2.384
Prob > z = 0.686 Prob > z = 0.017
Notes: The Table reports sample means and standard errors in parentheses. The test statistics and p-values are
reported in the margins for the various two sample tests.
to defensive and offensive spending. Figure 2 plots the level of conﬂict across the levels of
property rights for both the low and high returns on investment. According to hypothesis 1,
conﬂict should be decreasing in property rights. The ﬁgure demonstrates this is clearly the
case. Table 2 reports the mean levels of conﬂict as a percentage of the endowment and the
results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. For either level of the return on investment the mean level
of conﬂict is lower when property rights is higher and the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. To demonstrate the economic signiﬁcance, increasing property rights from π =2 to π =4
decreases mean conﬂict from 46% to 37% of the endowment. This represents a 20% reduction
in the fraction of resources allocated to conﬂict.
According to hypothesis 3, the rate of return on investment should not have an effect on
the level of conﬂict. However, Table 2 reports an 8.0% reduction in conﬂict when the level of
property rights was high, which is statistically signiﬁcant. We observe no such change when
property rights were low. Thus, the results for hypothesis 3 are mixed.
Examination of the contingent components of conﬂict, defensive and offensive spending,
reveals the source of the inconsistency from theoretical predictions. Figure 3 plots the level
of offensive and defensive spending across the levels of property rights for both the low and
high returns on investment. Note that there is a reduction in offensive spending as property
rights improve, but the rate of return on investment has no effect. Table 3 indicates that the



































Low (2) High (4)
Level of Property Rights
Defense w/ Low Return (3) Defense w/ High Return (5)
Offense w/ Low Return (3) Offense w/ High Return (5)
Figure 3: Mean Offensive Spending and Mean Defensive Spending per Treatment
Table 3: Mean Offensive Spending per Treatment as a Percentage of Endowment
Property Rights
Return on Investment Low (π = 2) High (π = 4) Test Statistic
Low (A = 3) 0.275 0.158 z = 7.982
(0.203) (0.127) Prob > z = 0.000
High (A = 5) 0.269 0.153 z = 8.977
(0.204) (0.131) Prob > z = 0.000
Test Statistic z = 0.445 z = 0.699
Prob > z = 0.656 Prob > z = 0.484
Notes: See notes Table 2.
effect of property rights is statistically signiﬁcant for changes in offensive spending. Thus,
the inconsistency between observed behavior and theoretical predictions resides in defensive
spending. There is relatively no difference in defensive spending across treatments. Table 4
shows that there are statistically signiﬁcant effects.
All of the hypothesis tests above assume the samples to be independent, which is clearly
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Table 4: Mean Defensive Spending per Treatment as a Percentage of Endowment
Property Rights
Return on Investment Low (π = 2) High (π = 4) Test Statistic
Low (A = 3) 0.214 0.254 z = −3.169
(0.100) (0.128) Prob > z = 0.002
High (A = 5) 0.216 0.228 z = −0.766
(0.103) (0.108) Prob > z = 0.444
Test Statistic z = 0.002 z = 2.519
Prob > z = 0.998 Prob > z = 0.012
Notes: See notes Table 2.
Table 5: Linear Regression Results for Conﬂict.
(1) (2)
Treatment {3,2} 4.89*** 4.14***
(0.21) (0.055)
Treatment {5,2} 4.85*** 4.07***
(0.19) (0.055)
Treatment {3,4} 4.13*** 3.20***
(0.19) (0.23)
Treatment {5,4} 3.81*** 3.11***
(0.19) (0.22)
Subject Effects No Yes
Period Effects No Yes
R2 0.865 0.926
Notes: The dataset consists of a panel of 58 subjects over 20 decision periods (1130
observations). Errors are clustered by subject. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. Statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coefﬁcients: ”*” signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, ”**”signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and ”***”signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
not the case given the within-subjects design. We now analyze the level of conﬂict controlling
for subject-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc effects. Table 5 reports the regression results for linear
models estimated via ordinary least squares. Model (1) includes only the treatment dummy
variables. Model (2) adds subject and round ﬁxed-effects. The results from the panel models
are consistent with the results from the pooled regression. Table 6 reports the results of formal
hypothesis tests on the regression coefﬁcients. The results of the hypothesis tests in Table 6 are
summarized below.
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Table 6: Hypothesis Test Results for Conﬂict.
Hypothesis (1) (2)
1: HO : β3,4−β3,2 ≥ 0 -3.60 -4.73
HA : β3,4−β3,2 < 0 (0.00) (0.00)
1: HO : β5,4−β5,2 ≥ 0 -5.26 -5.19
HA : β5,4−β5,2 < 0 (0.00) (0.00)
2: HO : 1−β3,2−β5,2 = 0 0.23 0.68
HA : 1−β3,2−β5,2 6= 0 (0.41) (0.41)
2: HO : 1−β3,4−β5,4 = 0 2.32 0.98
HA : 1−β4,4−β5,4 6= 0 (0.01) (0.17)
Subject Fixed-Effects N.A. 69872.69
(0.00)
Round Fixed-Effects N.A. 1.32
(0.20)
Notes: Columns correspond to the models estimated in Table 5. The numbered hy-
pothesis tests report the t-statistic. The subject and period effects are F-statistics. The
numbers in parentheses are the p-values. ”N.A.” means not applicable.
Result 1 Four out of four tests reject the hypothesis that stronger property rights do not de-
crease conﬂict. Thus we ﬁnd strong support for hypothesis 1.
Result 2 Three out of four tests fail to reject the hypothesis that technological progress does
not decrease conﬂict. Thus we ﬁnd weak support for hypothesis 3.
4.2 Analysis of Investment Choices
We now examine the effect of our treatment variables on average investment. Recall that
subjects could retain their endowment; subjects had the option of not allocating some or all
of their endowment. However, over all treatments subjects allocated their entire endowment
among the three activities 92.5% of the time. Thus, the effects on investment mirror those of
conﬂict. According to hypothesis 2, investment should increase with increased property rights.
Figure 4 demonstrates that increasing property rights results in an increase in observed mean
investment for either rate of return on investment. For the high return on the investment (A=5),
increasing property rights results in an increase in investment from 51.5% to 61.3% of the


















































Low (2) High (4)
Level of Property Rights
Low Return (3) High Return (5)
Figure 4: Mean Investment per Treatment
endowment. This represents a 19% increase in the fraction of resource allocated to investment.
Note that since participants were allocating all of their endowments, Figure 3 suggests that the
observed increase in investment is attributable solely to the reductions in offensive spending
which accompany improvements in property rights. That is, rather than poor property rights
resulting in individuals consuming their resources directly, our results suggest that offensive
spending in the face of relatively weak property rights crowds out investment. Table 7 reports
mean levels of investment as a percentage of the endowment for each treatment and reports the
results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The table demonstrates that the effect of increased property
rights is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. According to hypothesis 4, investment should
be unaffected by increasing the rate of return on investment. The table suggests while this is
true for relatively weak property rights, there is a statistically signiﬁcant increase in investment
for relatively strong property rights (although the economic signiﬁcance is not all that great;
only a 6% increase in the fraction of resources allocated).
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Table 7: Mean Investment per Treatment as a Percentage of Endowment
Property Rights
Return on Investment Low (π = 2) High (π = 4) Test Statistic
Low (A = 3) 0.493 0.573 z = −5.117
(0.203) (0.188) Prob > z = 0.000
High (A = 5) 0.506 0.608 z = −7.300
(0.184) (0.172) Prob > z = 0.000
Test Statistic z = −0.829 z = −2.309
Prob > z = 0.407 Prob > z = 0.021
Notes: See notes Table 2.
Table 8: Linear Regression Results for Investment.
(1) (2)
Treatment {3,2} 4.93*** 4.14***
(0.22) (0.055)
Treatment {5,2} 5.06*** 4.07***
(0.20) (0.055)
Treatment {3,4} 5.73*** 3.20***
(0.22) (0.23)
Treatment {5,4} 6.08*** 3.11***
(0.21) (0.22)
Subject Effects No Yes
Period Effects No Yes
R2 0.865 0.926
Notes: See notes Table 5.
Again, the hypothesis tests above assume the samples to be independent, which is not the
case. As such, we analyze the level of investment controlling for subject-speciﬁc and period-
speciﬁc effects. Table 8 reports the regression results for linear probability models estimated
via ordinary least squares. Model (1) includes only the treatment dummy variables. Model (2)
adds subject and round ﬁxed-effects. The results from the panel models are consistent with the
results from the pooled regression. Table 9 reports the results of formal hypothesis tests on the
regression coefﬁcients. The results of the hypothesis tests in Table 9 are summarized below.
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Table 9: Hypothesis Test Results for Investment.
Hypothesis (1) (2)
1: HO : β3,4−β3,2 ≤ 0 3.51 4.73
HA : β3,4−β3,2 > 0 (0.00) (0.00)
1: HO : β5,4−β5,2 ≤ 0 5.03 5.19
HA : β5,4−β5,2 > 0 (0.00) (0.00)
2: HO : 1−β3,2−β5,2 = 0 0.80 0.68
HA : 1−β3,2−β5,2 6= 0 (0.21) (0.41)
2: HO : 1−β3,4−β5,4 = 0 2.38 0.95
HA : 1−β4,4−β5,4 6= 0 (0.01) (0.33)
Subject Fixed-Effects N.A. 1.8e+14
(0.00)
Round Fixed-Effects N.A. 1.32
(0.20)
Notes: See notes Table 6.
Result 3 Four out of four tests reject the hypothesis that stronger property rights do not in-
crease investment. Thus we ﬁnd strong support for hypothesis 2.
Result 4 Three out of four tests fail to reject the hypothesis that technological progress does
not increase increase. Thus we ﬁnd weak support for hypothesis 4.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents the results from a laboratory experiment examining the effect of prop-
erty rights and productivity under anarchy. Under anarchy, imperfect property rights requires
resources be diverted away from productive activities in order to establish “effective property
rights” (Gonzalez, 2007). Distinguishing between offensive and defensive appropriation, as
in Grossman and Kim (1995) and Gonzalez (2007), allows property rights to enter the con-
ﬂict technology. Property rights determines the relative effectiveness of defensive to offensive
appropriation. We implement a 2 x 2 experimental design with two levels of property rights
and two rates of return on investment. This design allows us to investigate the effect of prop-
erty rights and productivity on conﬂict. While property rights is predicted to reduce conﬂict,
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increasing the rate of return on investment is predicted to have no effect on the amount of
resources allocated to conﬂict.
As predicted, increasing property rights decreases observed conﬂict and increases observed
investment, regardless of the return on investment. However, in contrast to the symmetric Nash
equilibrium prediction, the decrease in conﬂict is due entirely to a decrease in offensive ap-
propriation. Observed defensive appropriation is nondecreasing in the level of property rights.
Increasing the rate of return on investment has no effect on the observed levels of offensive
appropriation (at either level of property rights) or defensive appropriation (at the low level of
property rights).
Our results should be interpreted as evidence of the importance of property rights in assess-
ing the potential of foreign aid to stimulate growth. Many developing economies are plagued
withinstitutionalproblemswhicheffectivelyreducethereturnsofallformsofinvestments. Our
results suggest that a pre-condition for effective investment policies must be relatively secure
property rights. Moreover, our results highlight an important aspect of institutional develop-
ment, particularly with respect to property rights. While we observe reductions in offensive
spending with improvements in property rights, we failed to observe associated reductions in
defensive spending. This suggests that mere presence of imperfect property rights may create
a sense of suspicion wherein offensive spending reacts immediately to institutional improve-
ments but defensive spending lags due to remaining concerns regarding expropriation. Thus, in
the dynamic context in which developing economies evolve, institutional improvements have
both short term and long term beneﬁts on the efﬁcacy of aid. In the short term, improvements
reduce the appropriative activities which crowd out investments. In the longer term, improved
property rights should further increase investment by demonstrating to individuals that expro-
priation is less likely and thereby reduce defensive spending. This suggests that the coupling of
aid with incentives to improve institutions can have signiﬁcant positive effects on investment
across both short and long term horizons.
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